Javakheti after the Rose Revolution :Progress and Regress in the Pursuit of National Unity in Georgia by Lohm, Hedvig
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI)  
 ECMI Headquarters: Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor) D-24939 Flensburg Germany 
  +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0   fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19   Internet: http://www.ecmi.de 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Javakheti after the Rose Revolution:  
Progress and Regress in the Pursuit of National Unity 
in Georgia 
 
 
 
Hedvig Lohm 
 
 
 
 
ECMI Working Paper #38 
 
April 2007
2 
 
ECMI Working Paper #38 
 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Director: Dr. Marc Weller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2007 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Published in April 2007 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
ISSN: 1435-9812 
3 
Table of Contents 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 4 
II. JAVAKHETI IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC TERMS ........................................................... 5 
1. The Current Socio-Economic Situation ............................................................................. 6 
2. Transformation of Agriculture ........................................................................................... 8 
3. Socio-Economic Dependency on Russia .......................................................................... 10 
III. DIFFERENT ACTORS IN JAVAKHETI ................................................................... 12 
1. Tbilisi influence on Javakheti .......................................................................................... 12 
2. Role of Armenia and Russia ............................................................................................. 13 
3. International NGO involvement in Javakheti .................................................................. 15 
4. Local actors and organisations in Javakheti .................................................................... 16 
IV. INCONSISTENT INTEGRATION POLICIES .......................................................... 19 
1. Fulfilling International Minority Rights Standards ......................................................... 19 
2. Insufficient Political Representation of National Minorities ........................................... 21 
V. INITIATIVES FOR CREATING ‘NATIONAL UNITY’ ............................................ 23 
1. Political Representation and Local Self Governance Reforms ......................................... 23 
2. The October 2006 Local Elections in Javakheti ............................................................... 25 
3. Education Reforms ........................................................................................................... 27 
4. Administrative reforms ..................................................................................................... 30 
5. The Failure to Establish Trust in Rule of Law ................................................................. 33 
6. Language – the Biggest Barrier to Integration ................................................................ 34 
VI. DISPUTED ISSUES: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY AND AUTONOMY ................. 36 
1. The Historical Settlers of Javakheti ................................................................................. 36 
2. The Miscommunication on Churches .............................................................................. 36 
3. The Fear of Demographic Change...................................................................................  38 
4. The Constant Perception of Discrimination ..................................................................... 40 
5. Mass Meetings Instead of Political Participation ............................................................. 40 
6. The Negative Role of the Media ....................................................................................... 41 
7. The Non-Resolved Status of Javakheti ............................................................................. 42 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ................................................................................... 44 
 
4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Javakheti1 is situated in the South-East of Georgia, and is densely inhabited by Georgia’s second 
largest national minority, Armenians.
2
 In most respects, Javakheti has been more dependent on 
Russia (in socio-economic terms) and Armenia (in cultural terms) than on its proper state, 
Georgia, since Georgia gained independence in 1991. Throughout the 1990s the region was often 
described as a ‘potential hot-spot’, yet another possible breakaway region in the Caucasus. This 
working paper will look into whether the situation has started to change in terms of whether 
Javakheti is now closer to becoming an integrated part of Georgia, given that territorial unity has 
been one of the main priorities of the Georgian government since the ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003. 
The aim of this paper is thus to create a better understanding of the challenges that Javakheti 
faces, in order to facilitate an informed debate on the current situation and the future 
development of the region.  
 This study is based on more than 50 interviews with local inhabitants, the authorities and 
other related parties as well as on a review of legal documents and analytical articles during 
November-December 2006.
3
 The paper is structured in four main parts. First, the recent socio-
economic developments in Javakheti will be accounted for. Second, the main NGOs and political 
actors in the region will be identified and the role of Armenia and Russia will be outlined. At the 
same time, a recent history of power structures will be provided, as well as an analysis of the 
current lack of a central framework for integration policies in Georgia. Subsequently the 
consequences of the ongoing local self-governance reforms, the local elections and the 
government’s attempts to create national unity will be analysed. Finally differences in 
perceptions between Georgians and Armenians will be elaborated on.  
                                                
1
 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) has been present in Javakheti since 2003. By establishing a resource 
centre in Akhalkalaki (2004) and by assisting in the establishment of Javakheti Citizen’s Forum (2005) it works to 
enhance the local civil society network, through community mobilisation and dialogue with central actors. ECMI 
has also carried out several fact-finding missions and published policy-oriented working papers. The first ECMI 
working paper on Javakheti, ‘Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia’, was 
finalized in 2004 by Jonathan Wheatley, and can be found at http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_22.pdf. 
2
 According to the 2002 census there are 248,929 Armenians in Georgia. 90,373 of them live in Javakheti and 
22,974 in Samtskhe. The remaining Armenians mainly reside in Tbilisi. In addition, there are ethnic Armenians 
residing in the breakaway republic of Abkhazia, but they were not accounted for in the census. 
3
 A substantial number of research and fact-finding missions have been conducted in the region. For readers who are 
not familiar with the region it is therefore recommended to get additional background information. For ECMI 
reports see www.ecmi.de/rubrik/58/working+papers. 
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II. JAVAKHETI IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC TERMS 
Javakheti4 is part of the Samtskhe-Javakheti mkhare (province).5 It borders both Armenia and 
Turkey. The climate is harsh, and a significant share of its territory is covered by high 
mountains.
6
 Javakheti is composed of the rayon (districts) of Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki. In 
Akhalkalaki rayon 51 out of the 61 villages with election precincts7 are ethnic Armenian, while 
seven are Georgian (Gogasheni, Apnia, Kotelia, Okami, Azmana, Ptena, Chunchkha), two are 
mixed Georgian-Armenian (Baraleti and Murjakheti) and one is mixed Armenian, Georgian and 
Greek (Khospio).
8
 In Ninotsminda rayon 29 of the 31 villages with election precincts are 
Armenian, while one village (Spasovka) is mainly inhabited by Georgians resettled from Ajara 
in the beginning of the 1990s and one is mixed Armenian and Russian Dukhobor (Gorelovka).9  
 
Table 1: Inhabitants of Javakheti according to the 2002 census
10
 
 
 Georgians Armenians Russians
11
 Greeks Others  In total 
Akhalkalaki 
rayon 
3,214 57,516 157 51 37 60,975 
Ninotsminda 
rayon 
476 32,857 943 5 24 34,305 
In total 3,690 90,373 1,100 56 45 95,280 
 
 
An important factor behind Javakheti’s current isolation and lack of effective infrastructure is its 
geographic position. The isolation was reinforced during Soviet times by the fact that the region 
                                                
4
 Javakheti is the Georgian denotation of this region, in Armenian it is Javakhk. 
5
The province of Samtskhe-Javakheti was created as part of an administrative-territorial reform in 1994 by merging 
the historical regions of Samtskhe and Javakheti.  
6
Akhalkalaki city is at an altitude of 1,750 above sea level, while several of the villages in Ninotsminda rayon are 
located on more than 2,000 metres above sea level. 
7
 One election precinct has at least a hundred inhabitants. 
8
 According to the 2002 census there are 56 Greeks in Javakheti, 51 in Akhalkalaki rayon and 5 in Ninotsminda 
rayon. In Samtskhe there are in total 684 Greeks. The majority of Greeks fled to Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo 
Kartli from the Ottoman Empire in the early 19
th
 century, while asmall share are Caucasian Greeks who lived in 
Georgia since ancient times. Author’s interview with one of the active Greeks in Akhalkalaki. 
9
The village of Gorelovka is the last compact settlement of Dukhobors in the South Caucasus; Dukhobors are a 
Russian ethno-religious sect that was forced to resettle in Georgia in the early 19
th
 century. Apart from Gorelovka 
there are still Dukhobors residing in the villages of Ninotsminda, Orlovka, Efremovka, Spasovka, Sameba, 
Tambovka and Rodionovka. For more information see Hedvig Lohm, ‘Dukhobors in Georgia: A Study of the Issue 
of Land Ownership and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ninotsminda rayon (Samtskhe-Javakheti)’. ECMI Working Paper 
35. November 2006 available at http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_28.pdf. 
10
The Results of the First National Population Census of Georgia of the year 2002; State Statistics Department of 
Georgia. (Tbilisi: State Statistical Department of Georgia; LTD ‘Informational Publishing Centre’ Book I, 2003). 
11
The Russians are in most cases the Dukhobor population.  
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shares a border with Turkey. This was one of two direct borders between the Soviet Union and a 
NATO country, and a 78 km long stretch of land constituted a closed border zone subject to 
strict travel limitations. The region was dominated by the Russian 62
nd
 divisional base located in 
the biggest town in Javakheti, Akhalkalaki. Generally speaking, the region was not prioritised in 
terms of socio-economic development. Apart from the base, it relied mainly on agriculture, 
specifically by producing dairy products and potatoes. As the Soviet market collapsed and civil 
wars erupted, the region of Javakheti became virtually isolated from the rest of Georgia in terms 
of transport infrastructure and economic ties.  
 The socio-economic problems affecting all of Georgia’s regions during the 1990s were 
endemic in Javakheti: mass unemployment, a bad electricity situation, poor infrastructure and 
high levels of corruption. Javakheti experienced massive out-migration, mainly to the Russian 
Federation. There are no official emigration figures, but it can be assumed that as many as 20-30 
percent of the population has left.
12
 Today most of the remaining inhabitants are relying on 
subsistence agriculture and cash transfers from relatives in Russia. Since the current government 
came to power socio-economic conditions in general have improved; nevertheless, conditions 
have deteriorated somewhat for individual households in Javakheti.  
 
1. The Current Socio-Economic Situation 
Certain significant improvements in the economic situation have been observed since the current 
government took over in late 2003. Today, the Georgian government is regularly distributing 
state pensions and salaries of public servants throughout the country. Even though the 
reimbursements remain meagre (the standard state pension is 38 Georgian Lari per month, i.e. 
around 20 USD), it is an important cash inflow for the impoverished population, who often did 
not receive any salaries or reimbursements during Shevardnadze’s presidency. Another change 
for the better is a more reliable supply of electricity to the region.13 The provision of potable 
water and the irrigation system have also improved, although some more remote villages still 
share one single water source (Poka is one example). The state has arranged several youth camps 
                                                
12
The official decrease of the population from 1989 to 2002 is however only 11 percent. (It decreased from 107,003 
to 95,280.) It can be assumed that the actual decrease of the population is higher than these official figures suggest, 
since the individuals leaving for seasonal and/or permanent work in Russia are for the most part still included in the 
2002 statistics. 
13
Partly this is due to an Armenian-Georgian agreement on providing electricity from an Armenian power plant. See 
Mikael Hertoft, ‘Javakheti: The Temperature 2005’. (ECMI Occasional Paper, April 2006 availaible at 
http://www.ecmigeorgia.org/works/occasional_paper_hertoft) at page 20. 
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where youths from different parts of Georgia meet, which is commonly perceived as a positive 
integrating initiative. Another positive change is the construction of several football stadiums 
and sports complexes in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda. 
It is also noteworthy that the circulation of Georgian Lari (hereafter referred to as GEL) 
has increased markedly in Javakheti. Five years ago the Russian rouble was practically the only 
currency in Javakheti, while today the division is approximately 50-50 in market stalls and 
shops. The local economy has thereby moved closer towards integrating into the national 
economy. In terms of financial activities three Georgian banks are nowadays present in 
Javakheti: the Sakhalkho Bank, the United Georgian Bank and Taobank. Moreover Credo, a 
credit institution affiliated with World Vision International and the ‘Microfinance Centre for 
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States’, has started giving credits to small 
businesses.  
The most significant changes are the extensive infrastructural programs that are being 
carried out in Javakheti. The Georgian government is investing 25 million USD in the 
rehabilitation of the road between Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, which was half-way complete at 
the time of writing. More importantly, the American ‘Millennium Challenge Georgia Fund’ is 
investing 102 million USD in the rehabilitation of the Akhalkalaki-Ninotsminda-Tsalka-Tbilisi 
road.14 The repair works will start in mid-2007. The reconstructed Tsalka road will shorten travel 
time by car from Javakheti to the capital by several hours, since it will be possible to avoid the 
detour via Akhaltsikhe and Borjomi. The Georgian government has also undertaken to restore 
the railway from Tbilisi to Akhalkalaki via Tsalka.15 This will connect with a new railway that is 
to be built from Akhalkalaki to Kars in Turkey.
 16
 Once the Kars railway is finalised it will 
                                                
14
 See www.mcg.ge and Economic Policy Research Center Monitoring of Millennium Challenge Program at 
osgf.ge/data/file_db/Publications/MCG_Report_ENG_TAtNu7zIV4.pdf 
15
 An old one-track railway connection between Tbilisi and Akhalkalaki via Ninotsminda was already restored by 
the Georgian government in the summer of 2006. It is scheduled to run only from May to October. The rest of the 
year the tracks are blocked by snow.  
16
 In January 2007 the Azeri government agreed on a long-term 200 million USD loan to the Georgian government 
to finalise its share of the railroad. Estimates for the total cost of the project vary from USD 400 million to USD 600 
million. USD 300 million is supposed to be invested in Akhalkalaki rayon in order to construct a 29-kilometre 
railway track from Akhalkalaki to the Turkish border and to further rehabilitate the 192-kilometre section between 
Akhalkalaki and Tbilisi. See Civil Georgia, ‘Azerbaijan, ‘Georgia Close to Finalize Deal on Railway Project’, 2007-
01-12, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14444. 
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connect Turkey and Azerbaijan and will simplify cargo transport from Central Asia and China to 
Europe.17   
A factor that impacts negatively on the overall socio-economic situation in Javakheti is 
the rampant increase in prices occurring throughout Georgia, partly as a consequence of the 
Russian economic sanctions and the increase in fuel costs. (For more elaboration on Russian 
influences see below.) During 2006, the inflation rate was 8.8 percent and the price of food and 
non-alcoholic drinks rose by 13.4 percent.18  
 
2. Transformation of Agriculture  
Another reason for the somewhat deteriorated condition of household economies is the 
transformation of the agricultural sector. Even though Javakheti was an isolated region during 
Soviet times it was, in agricultural terms, rather fruitful. The black soil is found in the region is 
productive even though the harsh climate creates a short season. During the Soviet period meat, 
dairy products, barley, wheat, oats, green peas and lentils were produced. Except for the people 
employed at the military base, the majority of the population worked in the collective 
agricultural sector, in the so-called sovkhozes and kolkhozes. There was also an established food 
processing industry that processed and distributed agricultural produce throughout the centrally 
planned Soviet system. When the Soviet Union fell apart the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were 
abolished and much of their property was embezzled. Together with the collapse of the economic 
and infrastructural system, this had an immense impact on the region. A few influential people 
were able to secure the most important assets (such as farm machinery) and the biggest parcels 
of lands. In most villages, 2-3 families have control over 200-300 hectares, while the rest of the 
population have typically 1.25 hectares each (at the very best 5 hectares).19 These large-scale 
                                                
17
 Armenia, however, opposes the project and urges that the Kars-Gyumri rail link be restored. This link is presently 
closed due to the trade blockade imposed on Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey after the Nagorny Karabakh war. 
Allegedly, the Armenian lobby also managed to make the US refrain from investing in the Kars-Akhalkalaki 
project. In Javakheti local nationalist organisations – chiefly Virk and United Javakhk – also oppose the project. 
However, a fair share of the local population sees potential socio-economic advantages in the project. Nevertheless, 
several respondents are concerned by the fact that these major infrastructural investments so far have not generated 
employment opportunities for the local workforce. Civil Georgia, ‘Tbilisi, Baku Agree on Funding of Regional 
Railway Link’, 2007-01-13, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14447. 
18
 See www.statistics.ge. 
19
 One important state reform in the early 1990s was to grant each household a maximum of 1.25 hectares of land 
for free, and it is not rare that this is the only land available for farmers. For more information see Hedvig Lohm, 
‘Dukhobors in Georgia: A Study of the Issue of Land Ownership and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ninotsminda rayon 
(Samtskhe-Javakheti)’, (ECMI Working Paper 35. November 2006.) available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_28.pdf. 
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landowners were often able to secure this land illegally by knowing (or bribing) the right people 
in the local bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the majority of people were left with too small land plots 
and too few resources to create productive and profitable farming units.
20
 There is also a lack of 
tractors, seeding machines, ploughs, combines, high quality seeds, pesticides, fertilisers, updated 
irrigation systems21 and qualified veterinarians. During recent years plagues of field mice have 
destroyed a large part of the harvest. Approximately 45 GEL is needed just to cultivate one 
hectare, excluding the costs of hiring a tractor and buying seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Often 
people cultivate by hand or by horsepower since they cannot afford modern machinery. 
Furthermore, there are no remaining stoking-up sites, processing industries or canning factories, 
and given the bad roads to the major markets and the high costs of transportation, it is hardly 
profitable to bring agricultural products to Tbilisi (this will however improve with the ongoing 
road rehabilitations).
22
 Most farmers cultivate potatoes or let their animals graze on their fields. 
Then they either barter with farmers from other regions, or sell milk to the few cheese factories 
that exist locally. The Akhalkalaki farmers more often sell potatoes in Tbilisi compared to the 
farmers in Ninotsminda, who seem to rely on barter to a greater extent.
23
  
Currently, a second round of privatisation of agricultural lands is taking place in Georgia. 
Small-scale farmers without proper contracts for their leased lands will most likely be the losers 
in these changes, since they do not have the means to benefit from privatisation. Most will lack 
the means to buy cadastral maps and register documents in order to buy lands at special auctions. 
In addition, there is a major risk that the farmers will not be properly informed by the local 
authorities. If this process is not transparent and effective, economic conditions for subsistence 
farmers will deteriorate even further and this will also increase tension between different groups 
and families.24  
Since agriculture does not generate an income for most people, it is necessary for each 
family to find additional jobs. Merely heating a normal Javakheti house costs around 700-1,000 
                                                
20
 Mercy Corps is currently developing a project on agricultural cooperatives in Akhalkalaki rayon to 
help farmers to pool resources and machinery. In addition, the Millennium Challenge Fund Georgia is giving grants 
to individual farmers and cooperatives all over Georgia. 
21
 UNDP and CHF have invested money in repairing some of the main irrigation systems in the region. 
22
 Both World Vision International’s Georgia’s Entrepreneurs’ Fund (GEF) and CHF’s ‘Georgia Employment and 
Infrastructure Initiative’ is developing projects to rehabilitate infrastructure and to assist in establishing Micro 
Finance businesses, for example in cheese-producing mini-factories. See respectively 
http://www.worldvision.org/about_us.nsf/child/aboutus_georgia?Open#today and 
http://geiiwebsite.web-prs.com/portals/_GEII/static_files/CurrentCHFCommunities.pdf. 
23
 Author’s interviews. 
24
 For more information on land privatisation see Lohm, ‘Dukhobors in Georgia…’. 
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USD per winter. In most villages, these costs may be bypassed by drying dung and using it for 
heating. This is, however, a heavy and time-consuming activity.  
 
3. Socio-Economic Dependency on Russia 
From the government’s point of view, the main achievement in Javakheti is the complete 
withdrawal of the 62
nd
 Divisional Russian military base in Akhalkalaki that should be finalised 
during 2007. Russia has been committed to this withdrawal since 1999, but it was only initiated 
after a deal was struck in early 2006.25 The Russian military has already withdrawn a major share 
of its artillery by transporting material to Gyumri in Armenia.26 While this is a step towards 
consolidating Georgian territorial integrity, it is not welcomed by the population in Javakheti, 
who are socio-economically dependent on the base. Even though the Georgian government has 
given away some vague promises on job generation, ranging from plans by the Ministry of 
Defence to buy milk and potatoes from Javakheti to the establishment of a new Georgian base in 
Akhalkalaki,
 27
 there are no indications that the government is preparing any active development 
policy in the region.  
Previously the military base, which employed some 1,500-2,000 men, was the main 
employer in Akhalkalaki rayon. (Few households in Ninotsminda rayon have been dependent on 
the base.) The monthly salary for local military servicemen is approximately 300 USD – a good 
salary in Javakheti terms. In addition, the base has employed local support personnel at the 
hospital and at a Russian school that is located there. Around the base a local service sector has 
developed that supplies food and additional services. The base has also created a substantial 
shadow economy market of gasoline, petrol and building materials.28 Therefore it is difficult to 
estimate how much the base adds to the local economy. Most estimates range from 500,000 GEL 
                                                
25
 Civil Georgia, ‘Georgia ratifies Military Treaties with Russia’, 2006-04-13, available at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12339.  
26
 See Vladimir Socor, ‘Moscow signals it may redeploy some forces from Georgia to Armenia’. Jamestown 
Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2005-05-24, Volume 2, Issue 101. When it comes to the rest of Georgia the Tbilisi 
garrison has already been evacuated, while the base in Batumi will be closed by 2008. See Civil Georgia, ‘Russia 
Withdraws Tbilisi Garrison Ahead of Schedule’, 2006-10-11, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13839 
and Civil Georgia, ‘Okruashvili Downplays Russia’s Threats to Suspend Troop Pullout’, 2006-09-30, at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13713. 
27
 Civil Georgia, ‘Saakashvili Calls to ‘End the Isolation’ of Javakheti’, 2005-09-07, available at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10697. See also David Young, ‘Javakheti – Georgia’s 
contagious separatism’ May 11, 2006. Transitions Online. Available at 
http://www.gfsis.org/pub/eng/showpub.php?detail=1&id=99.  
28
 See Ekaterine Metreveli. The Dynamics of Frozen Tension – Case of Javakheti. (Georgian Foundation for 
Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi, 2004). 
11 
to 1,000,000 GEL per month. In comparison, the 2006 annual budget of the gamgeoba in 
Akhalkalaki was 1,972,000 GEL.  
The other main source of income for local families is seasonal labour migration to the 
Russian Federation. In most families it is claimed that at least one male family member worked 
in Russia during the 1990s on a seasonal basis. It is difficult to estimate how much money is 
being transferred from Russia, since it is often not done via banks. Some claim that per day more 
than 25,000 USD are being transferred only via banks.
29
 This seasonal labour migration has, 
however, diminished. Already in the year 2000 the conditions of the (often illegal) Caucasian 
immigrants became more complex as Russia imposed a visa regime on Georgian citizens. 
Moreover, considering the dramatic deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia in the 
autumn of 2006, illegal migrants currently face the possibility of deportation. The attitude 
towards Caucasians in Russia has also deteriorated.30 Some of the migrants from Javakheti 
circumvent many of the obstacles by buying an Armenian passport on the black market, but this 
is a costly, illegal and risky alternative. The procedure costs at least 3,000 USD in bribes and all 
Armenian citizens run the risk of being forcefully conscripted to the Armenian army.  
Local trade is dependent on selling small-scale contraband products (i.e. everyday 
commodities transported from Armenia). As the central authorities are cracking down on 
contraband trade all over Georgia, this business has become a risky project.  
Thus, while socio-economic prospects in general have improved for the region, mainly 
through new infrastructural investments, household economies have become increasingly 
strained. This is mainly due to the small-scale, outdated agricultural structure, which does not 
make farming worthwhile. At the same time prices of basic commodities are soaring, the main 
employer (i.e. the military base) is closing down and it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
obtain seasonal work in Russia.  
                                                
29
 Sergey Minasyan; ‘Situation in Javakhk in the context of the problem of Russian Military Bases’ 
Withdrawal from Georgia’, 21st Century; Volume 1, 2005. 
30
 Author’s interview. One interviewee said that his relative had now returned to Javakheti ‘voluntarily’ since he 
could not bear the constant harassment by the Russian authorities, and the necessity of paying at least 30 GEL a day 
in bribes to Russian officials and policemen. 
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III. DIFFERENT ACTORS IN JAVAKHETI 
 
1. Tbilisi influence on Javakheti 
In practice, Javakheti was beyond the jurisdiction and control of the centre during the early years 
of independence.31 Since the central authorities were not strong enough to uphold control of 
remote regions, alternative power structures developed. We will now look into how Javakheti 
was ruled, and to some extent is still being governed.  
Throughout the nineties, the then Head of State, Eduard Shevardnadze, gradually 
developed a power strategy that suited his purposes for Javakheti and kept secessionist 
sentiments at bay. It was based on aligning with, and co-opting, influential local power-brokers. 
If someone became too radical, his nationalist sentiments would often be tempered by his being 
offered a lucrative post either in Tbilisi (for example as a parliamentarian enjoying immunity 
from prosecution) or in local power structures (for example as head of local customs). These 
offers were, for the most part, accepted. The power brokers would then be balanced against each 
other in order to avoid one player becoming too influential. It is common to refer to these players 
as ‘clans’, implying an influential extended family business occupying influential political posts 
and controlling important economic activities in the region (for example petrol, firewood, 
restaurants and hotels).  
Interestingly enough it seems that the current government still relies on this strategy, 
despite dispensing with it in most other regions of Georgia (especially Tbilisi). One example is 
how one of the early nationalist activists in Javakheti is now chief of police in Akhalkalaki (see 
below). Another recent example of how this co-optation mechanism works was observed in the 
aftermath of the local elections in Ninotsminda rayon in October 2006. During these elections 
there was only one party registered in the rayon – Saakashvili’s ‘National Movement’. (This was 
the case in six other rayons in Georgia.)
32
 On the party list there were, however, representatives 
from two clans – some representing the interests of the previous acting gamgebeli (head of 
administration at rayon level), and some representing those of the majoritarian MP from 
                                                
31
 Two commonly cited examples are firstly how Gamsakhurdia failed to appoint ethnic Georgian prefects in 
Akhalkalaki and eventually was forced to appoint an Armenian prefect. (The prefect was executive head of the 
rayon, corresponding with today’s gamgebeli.) The second example took place during the days of the Military 
Council (1992) when the citizens of Javakheti were able to prevent the National Guard from entering Javakheti. See 
Voitsekh Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’, Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1998.  
32
 The National Movement got all 10 proportional seats in Ninotsminda rayon. In addition, 9 out of 10 Majoritarians 
are members of National Movement, while 1 independent candidate was elected. 
13 
Ninotsminda. When the votes were counted in the rayon it turned out that those loyal to the 
gamgebeli had a majority in the 20-seat sakrebulo. After an appeal against voting irregularities in 
one village (Orjalar) was turned down by the local court, the sakrebulo voted for the former 
acting gamgebeli as its speaker (which has become an influential post after the local self 
governance reforms). This was, however, not pleasing to the central players in the National 
Movement. A meeting was held on November 15, allegedly attended by the newly-elected 
speaker, the MP, the President’s Plenipotentiary Representative in Samtskhe-Javakheti, a vice 
speaker of the Georgian parliament, and another National Movement member. Once the meeting 
was over, the speaker handed in his letter of resignation and two weeks later he was arrested on 
charges of financial fraud.33 One local NGO representative described the event by saying that 
‘these are not democratic elections, it is still just the old type of appointments – one person was 
elected, but this was not acceptable so therefore the election had to be re-run.  
The Ninotsminda MP is also an example of how Javakheti’s main power brokers 
managed to survive the Rose Revolution. This MP was a loyal supporter of Shevardnadze from 
1999 until the Rose revolution. When the tables turned, he changed his political affiliation and 
survived. Such a quick reorientation was, for the most part, not possible for Shevardnadze’s 
former allies in Tbilisi, but in Javakheti the main players remained in power. Even though the 
sakrebulos have new members after the local elections, the system has not changed. The 
structure of co-optation from central levels is one of the main impediments to change in the 
region. The co-opted players retain their status quo since it is in their interest that government 
actors remain convinced that they are the only ones who can be trusted, banging the drum against 
‘Russian-influenced separatists’. In Section V, this working paper will discuss the more ‘official’ 
ways for the government to establish control, or national unity, over Javakheti. 
 
2. Role of Armenia and Russia 
It is important to bear in mind that Javakheti previously had almost no contacts with Georgia. 
Culturally and historically their ethnic kinsmen in Armenia have played a more important role 
than Georgia, while Russia is the socio-economic anchor and security guarantor. In Armenia, 
more than 100,000 citizens are recent migrants from Javakheti34; emigration started after World 
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War II and has continued since then.35 This constitutes an important impetus for Armenia to 
incorporate Javakheti issues onto its own political agenda as well as for the continuation of 
humanitarian assistance to the region. When Georgia declared independence in 1991 many 
Armenian Javakhetians had already voluntarily participated in the Nagorny Karabakh war, which 
began in 1988. But even though Javakheti gathered weapons and emotions ran high, a violent 
secessionist movement never emerged. The standard explanation is that their mother country, 
Armenia, could not afford to fight on two fronts; enemies in both Azerbaijan and Georgia would 
leave Armenia virtually blockaded.
36
 Thus, for geopolitical reasons the Armenian authorities are 
interested in maintaining good relations with Tbilisi rather than taking sides with Javakhetians. 
In its new ‘National Security Strategy’ Armenia identifies the Russian Federation and Georgia as 
its two main strategic partners.
37
 Another example of how Yerevan is trying to please Tbilisi is 
the recent arrest by Armenian Special Forces of one of the most active Javakheti nationalists.
38
 
“Yerevan does not like it that we have an agenda”, as the activist himself commented.
39
 
The influence of Russia can be accounted for in both socio-economic and psychological 
terms. As described in detail above, both remittances from seasonally employed Javakhetians in 
Russia and the contribution of the military base constitute the main cash inflows to the region. 
Beyond this, however, there are also psychological factors that underpin the importance of 
Russia in the perception of Javakhetian Armenians. Most Armenians argue that they have shared 
habits and mentality with Russians ever since the 1830s when the Russians conquered the region 
from the Ottomans. As one respondent explained: “The Russian soldiers may be bad or good, 
corrupted or not, but they are our Russians – we know them. With others, NATO forces for 
example, we don’t know them and that scares us.”
40
 The base is thus seen as a security guarantee 
by the population in Javakheti, who for the most part settled there after upheavals in the Ottoman 
Empire (both in the 1820s and the 1910s). Many of them have ancestors that fled from the 
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Turkish massacres of Christians in the 1910s, and they are still suffering from the trauma, under 
the impression that the Turks will come back to kill them.
41
 This fear is a crucial part of the 
collective identity of many Armenians in Javakheti, and it is being continuously transmitted to 
younger generations: even nursery rhymes touch upon it.
42
 Surprisingly, the base is also 
considered an important security guarantor by locals against Georgian aggression.
43
 
 
3. International NGO involvement in Javakheti 
During the 21
st
 century several international organisations have carried out projects in Javakheti. 
The Program of Conflict Prevention and Integration of the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (which incorporates legal assistance, language training and special re-
broadcasting of Georgian news from the main channels into Armenian) has probably had the 
most impact on the region, especially through its news re-broadcasting.
44
 However, the OSCE is 
now withdrawing from Javakheti, and stepping up its activities in Kvemo Kartli mkhare. The 
UNDP Samtskhe-Javakheti Integrated Development Programme (SJIDP) has been active in the 
region for several years, but most respondents are not well aware of what UNDP is actually 
doing. Under its 300 million USD program the American ‘Millennium Challenge Georgia Fund’ 
has – apart from the major Javakheti road rehabilitation program – projects to improve the 
performances of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, as well as agribusiness development 
activities in Georgia which will benefit Javakheti as well as other regions of Georgia.
45
 
International NGOs such as Care, CHF, CIMERA, ECMI, Mercy Corps, Urban Institute and 
World Vision International also carry out projects in Javakheti.  
In addition, Javakheti receives support from the Armenian state. Sixteen schools were renovated 
in Samtskhe-Javakheti during 2006 (400,000 USD), and school books, encyclopaedias and other 
equipment were donated. Each year the Armenian state also finances university studies for 70 
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students from Samtskhe-Javakheti in Armenia.
46
 Moreover, Javakheti receives humanitarian 
assistance from the rather influential Armenian Diaspora in the US and France. One important 
Diaspora organisation is HOM (an abbreviation for Union of Armenian Aid). HOM was 
established as a charity organisation in 2002 and gives assistance to medical institutions, for 
socio-economic improvements (mainly renovations of schools) and, according to its 
representative, also cooperates with the local church to help people to ‘find their faith’.
47
 
Another active organisation is the ‘Dashnak Javakhk Relief Program Committee’ which has 
channelled more than 250,000 USD to Javakheti since 2001.
48
  
 
4. Local actors and organisations in Javakheti 
There are more than 50 registered local NGOs in Javakheti, but only a few of them are actually 
active. In the Javakheti Citizen’s Forum
49
, for example, there are about 15 local NGOs 
cooperating on regional integration and development issues. In terms of local socio-political 
organisations there are several that share the same nationalist ideology and agenda. These 
organisations rely on a couple of hundred active supporters, and when sensitive issues come to 
the fore, they manage to mobilise a larger number of people to attend their demonstrations. As 
Marina Elbakidze at the ‘Caucasian Centre for Peace, Democracy and Development’ explained: 
“There is one standard set of issues that you can always mobilise the population in Akhalkalaki 
around: before it was the Russian military base, but it became passé after the Russians agreed to 
start withdrawing. Now it is the status of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the churches in 
Javakheti, the right to use Armenian as a regional administrative language and maybe opposing 
the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway.”
50
 The central authorities and also ethnic Armenian 
parliamentarians tend to stress that the demonstrations are staged, paid for by Russia. This, 
however, seems unlikely. Some funding for these organisations certainly comes from abroad, 
often from the Armenian Diaspora or from successful Armenian businessmen in Russia. Most 
importantly, it seems that nationalist ideology rather appeals to the locals. Even if they might not 
agree with the more radical statements, they still attend the meetings. 
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In terms of local political activity it is important to understand the slight difference 
between Akhalkalaki rayon and Ninotsminda rayon. The political scene tends to be more 
complex and volatile in Akhalkalaki. In general the population of the latter is more easily 
mobilised and highly suspicious of ‘Georgian initiatives’, whilst the Ninotsminda dwellers seem 
to be more inclined to local intrigues. This difference in mentality may be created by the 
presence of the military base in Akhalkalaki, generating possibilities for closer links with Russia 
and for trading. Therefore the organisations with a nationalist agenda have their hubs in 
Akhalkalaki. The most important actors are Javakhk, Virk, JEMM (Javakheti Youth Sport 
Union) and ‘United Javakhk’.  
The oldest player is Javakhk, which was established in 1988 to preserve Armenian 
cultural heritage, science and history, and to promote the protection of national institutions and 
the development of the region. Local activists, including Samvel Petrosyan, today’s Head of 
Police in Akhalkalaki rayon, were the initiators of this movement. Before 1995, Javakhk was, in 
practice, running the show in Javakheti. Since then, it has lost its central position, and several of 
its members are now members of the National Movement. 
Virk became famous in 2002, when David Rstakyan tried to register it as a political party. 
According to the Georgian Law on Political Associations of Citizens (Article 6) it is illegal to 
establish parties according to a regional or territorial basis, and because of this Rstakyan failed to 
establish a proper party. Today, Rstakyan claims that Virk has more than 7,000 members all over 
Georgia,
51
 but this number seems exaggerated. Others estimate that the organisation has a 
maximum of 1,000 active members – maybe less. Even though Virk seems to be less influential 
today than it was a couple of years ago, the organisation is respected among locals and its 
demands to make Javakheti an independent administrative region, and for the right to register 
Virk as a regional political party, has strong support.  
In recent years JEMM has established itself as a popular actor on the local scene (JEMM 
became a registered NGO in 2001). Its goal is to make the youth stay in Javakheti, by creating 
better opportunities and activities for them. Among other things, JEMM established a big sports 
gym in Akhalkalaki and about 20 gyms in surrounding villages. They also have a radio station 
(even though they claim that the local authorities are disturbing their frequency) and publish a 
monthly magazine, Khachatun. In addition, they established a Boy Scouts organisation. Some 
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respondents claim that their leader, Vahag Chakhalyan, is following close in the footsteps of 
Virk. He and JEMM allegedly also have connections with the French Diaspora and receive 
donations from rich Armenian businessmen in Russia.  
Recently United Javakhk has attracted the most attention, with JEMM activists as its 
most prominent participants (including Chakhalyan). It functions as a rather amorphous umbrella 
organisation for local actors. United Javakhk was established on March 10 2005, in direct 
connection with the Georgian parliament’s resolution demanding an immediate withdrawal of 
the Russian military bases in Georgia, and arranged two major demonstrations against the 
withdrawal (March 13 and March 31). Back then the withdrawal was a very sensitive issue for 
Javakhetians and had the potential to mobilise much of the population. As a result, United 
Javakhk grew very influential. According to themselves, they filed an application both in 2005 
and 2006 to become a political party, which was rejected on the same basis as Virk. In order to 
circumvent the ban on regional parties, United Javakhk leaders decided to strike a deal with the 
party ‘Industry Will Save Georgia’ in order to participate in the October 2006 local elections (see 
below). 
In addition, there are some other organisations based on ‘the standard Javakheti 
nationalist agenda’, such as the Union of Intellectuals. Allegedly, some Akhalkalaki actors are 
also affiliated with the pan-Armenian party Dashnaktsutyun (the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation); a radical party that propagated aligning Javakheti with Armenia throughout the 
1990s.52  
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IV. INCONSISTENT INTEGRATION POLICIES 
Following independence in 1991, multiethnic Georgia experienced the rise of the first president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s ethnic populism as well as two civil ethno-territorial wars in South 
Ossetia (1991-92) and Abkhazia (1992-93). Nationality was mainly defined along ethnic lines, 
and at worst national minorities were seen as ‘treacherous guests’, or ‘Kremlin’s agents in 
Georgia’.
53
 While Eduard Shevardnadze downplayed the inflammable Gamsakhurdia ethnic-
nationalistic rhetoric, he made no real steps to address integration issues made no real steps to 
address integration issues during his time as Head of State (1992-2003). The current Georgian 
president Mikhail Saakashvili has made serious attempts to forge a civic identity (i.e. equal 
inclusion and opportunities for all citizens), but so far his presidency has been more focused on 
national unity than on protecting minority rights.54 The creation of national unity has been 
pursued in several ways, as we will see in the following sections. Initially, progress in terms of 
fulfilling international minority rights standards since 2003 will be assessed, as well as the level 
of political representation of national minorities in Georgia. 
 
1. Fulfilling International Minority Rights Standards  
With respect to legal frameworks Georgia has recently ratified the Framework Convention on 
National Minorities (FCNM)55 and the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-
operation
56
. At the same time, the government has so far failed to fulfil its promises to the 
Council of Europe by postponing the signing and ratification of the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML). This charter provides substantial rights for minority 
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groups to use their languages, a highly sensitive issue for the Georgian government.57 Moreover, 
the Georgian parliament has so far failed to adopt a Law on National Minorities.  
On the central governance level, the government has not assigned an executive body to deal 
with regional integration, decentralisation and minority rights protection issues. Instead, several 
authorities, including the Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation, the State Minister on Civic 
Integration and the Security Council, are involved in, but rarely held accountable for, the lack of 
consistent progress. As in all policy fields, government structures relating to minority protection 
remain weak and lack institutionalization and coordination. The State Minister on Civic 
Integration (established in 2004), for example, is supposed to implement what Georgia has 
committed itself to by ratifying the FCNM, but she basically has no budget58, no strategy or say 
in general politics59. While the previous Presidential Adviser for Civic Integration, Anna 
Zhvania, represented a progressive force,60 she was transferred to another job in late 2006.
61
 She 
was replaced by a young, inexperienced politician who has not managed to publicly address civic 
integration issues so far. In the parliament, two committees deal in parallel with issues related to 
minority rights protection and regional integration: the ‘Human Rights and Civil Integration 
Committee’ as well as the ‘Regional Policy, Self-Government and Mountainous Regions 
Committee’.  
Two positive steps forward are the establishment of the Council of National Minorities, a 
consultative body under the auspices of the Public Defender’s Office (December 2005), and the 
creation of the Zurab Zhvania School for Public Administration in Kutaisi, which provides 
training of national minorities in the field of public administration. 
 At regional level there is a certain amount of duplication between the President’s 
Plenipotentiary Representative in Samtskhe-Javakheti (also referred to as the ‘trustee’ or 
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‘governor’), and the ‘regular’ executive and representative bodies, i.e. the rayon gamgebelis 
(executive managers) and sakrebulos (elected local municipality councils). Since there is no 
legal basis for the duties and responsibilities of the President’s Plenipotentiary Representatives, 
their interrelationship with the ‘regular’ bodies is unclear and often dependent on the influence 
of individual power brokers. Currently, the Regional Policy, Self-Government and Mountainous 
Regions Committee in the parliament is elaborating a draft law to clarify the situation. Among 
the potential responsibilities of the Presidential Representative is a monitoring function of the 
local authorities as part of the new Organic Law on Local Self-governance.  
To sum up: the Georgian government has created a legal platform for upholding 
international human and minority rights standards, but so far it has not managed to transform 
these intentions into national legislation (e.g. into a law on national minorities) and concrete 
policy action. Similarly, there is no authority assigned to deal with the integration of regions 
and/or minorities, and therefore both duplication and uncertainty complicates the resolution of 
these issues. It is important to bear in mind this overall weakness in institutional capacities and 
responsibilities while considering the situation in Javakheti – as well as the distance between 
Javakheti and central structures.  
 
2. Insufficient Political Representation of National Minorities 
National minorities, including ethnic Armenians, remain heavily under-represented in central 
posts in Georgia.
62
 This lack of representation is a major obstacle to truly integrating national 
minorities in general, and Javakhetians in particular, into Georgian society. At mkhare (province) 
level the situation is little better. The President’s Plenipotentiary Representative in Samtskhe-
Javakheti has, for example, never been Armenian. In fact, the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti 
was created as part of an administrative-territorial reform in 1994 by merging the regions of 
Samtskhe and Javakheti. Samtskhe has a majority of ethnic Georgian inhabitants, while 
Javakheti is dominated by ethnic Armenians. Often the inhabitants of Javakheti do not identify 
themselves with this territorial division, claiming that this is a way for the Georgian government 
to circumvent the interests of national minorities.
63
 (More than 90 percent of Javakheti’s 
population is ethnic Armenian, see Table 1, while only 20.5 percent of the population of 
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Samtskhe is Armenian). However, compared with the Azeri-dominated region of Kvemo Kartli, 
Armenians are much better represented at the level of the rayon.
64
 The head of the tax authorities 
and police in both Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki are Armenian. Both judges in Ninotsminda are 
Armenian, while 2 out of 3 judges in Akhalkalaki are Armenian (the third is an Armenian-
speaking Georgian from Akhaltsikhe). The only other important position held by a Georgian is 
that of local head of customs.  
Proportional political representation in Javakheti is also somewhat impeded by 
disproportionate electoral units. The individual electoral units have not been revised since 1921. 
The electoral precincts have therefore grown disproportionate to the actual population. In 
Akhalkalaki rayon, for example, 7 Georgian villages have 5 electoral districts, while the 
remaining 58 Armenian or mixed villages share the remaining 17 electoral districts.
65
 This 
creates barriers to increasing the political participation and representation of minorities.  
In conclusion, it can be said that there are still no proper mechanisms for developing 
consistent strategies, creating action plans and implementing regional development or 
infrastructural standards on national minorities. Neither are national minorities sufficiently 
represented in political institutions. These two factors are major impediments to the successful 
establishment of national unity, and a civic idea of Georgian citizenship.  
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V. INITIATIVES FOR CREATING ‘NATIONAL UNITY’  
Even though no authority is designated to develop a consistent approach to integration of 
national minorities and regional integration in Georgia, the current government is acting to create 
national unity in several ways. Here the main steps, relevant activities and events will be 
outlined: local self-governance reforms, local elections, educational reforms, reforms of the 
public sector and the monolingual policy of the government.  
 
1. Political Representation and Local Self Governance Reforms 
Georgia is a highly centralised state, and previously little responsibility was delegated to the 
regions (although for the most part they remained far from the reach of the weak central 
governmental structures). The 2005 local self-governance legislation therefore aims to 
decentralise responsibilities and powers to the regions. A new structure of 5 self-governed cities66 
and 65 municipality (formerly rayon) sakrebulos has been created in Georgia in order to 
redistribute more extensive responsibilities to lower level decision-making bodies. These local 
self governance units are intended to function independently of the state: for example, they 
should create budgets based on local tax revenues and centrally redistributed funds, take care of 
former state properties and carry out small scale infrastructure projects. In addition, they are 
supposed to develop strategic plans on issues such as environmental protection, health care, 
culture, law enforcement and rule of law. The new legislation on local self governance should 
therefore mean that the newly elected legislative bodies, the sakrebulos, and their appointed 
executive managers (gamgebelis) have increased influence over local development. Everyday 
monitoring and implementation should be facilitated in the villages by local ‘managers’ who are 
appointed by the gamgebelis.  
Even though this reform redistributes responsibility to lower levels, it remains to be seen 
if it will decentralise power and increase political participation and influence over local matters 
for the rural population in general and for national minorities in Javakheti in particular. In 
practice, the reforms are actually centralising local decision-making by abolishing the lowest tier 
of local self-government, that of the community (temi). Out of formerly 1,100 sakrebulos all 
over Georgia, only 65 municipality sakrebulos remain. In Javakheti one sakrebulo exists in 
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Akhalkalaki rayon (previously there were 22 community sakrebulos), and one in Ninotsminda 
rayon (previously 9 community sakrebulos). To increase the representation of the village 
population, one majoritarian sakrebulo member represents the respective interests of the 
village(s) that previously had a sakrebulo of its own. The intention is to create local decision-
making bodies which can function independently. However, these bodies still have an extremely 
limited budget and both the elected sakrebulo members and the local staff lack basic 
understanding of what can be done and how it should be done. There is a lack of knowledge, 
resources (such as the Internet) and, when it comes to Javakheti, even of sufficient understanding 
of the Georgian language to understand legal documents. One of the main obstacles, according to 
the director of the Centre for Effective Governance System and Territorial Arrangement Reform 
(CEGSTAR), is that sakrebulo members and gamgeoba staff are not aware of the possibilities 
that the reforms grant them, or are not capable of harmonizing and implementing it due to a lack 
of funding, training and human resources.67  
In terms of extra aid for remote and mountainous regions, there exists an equalizing 
formula that is supposed to redistribute funds from the central budget to the less developed 
regions of Georgia; however, so far the funds are small and the definition of what is counted as a 
‘mountainous region’ is still under discussion.  
There is also a lack of accountability in terms of what central executive body is 
responsible for the successful implementation of this decentralisation. Currently the main body 
dealing with the reform is the State Commission on Effective Governance System and Territorial 
Arrangement Reform, which is chaired by the president and representatives from several 
different ministries and involved bodies. This commission convenes only occasionally. It is 
assisted by the abovementioned organisation, CEGSTAR (mainly funded by UNDP), and 
partially coordinated by the ‘Regional Policy, Self-Government and Mountainous Regions 
Committee’ in parliament.  
The local executive bodies are not directly representative, as the gamgebeli (or the mayor 
of the self governed cities) is appointed by the sakrebulo, while the Plenipotentiary 
Representative of the President is appointed by the president. This might have a negative impact 
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on the decentralisation process and on the possibilities of raising public trust in local politics. 
Currently there is no body that is monitoring the implementation of the local self-governance 
reforms at rayon (municipality) level. According to a draft law, the Plenipotentiary 
Representative of the President will have this responsibility in the future.  
To sum up, the new reform could be an important tool for decentralisation and increased 
integration of regions in Georgia in the mid- to long term. Implementation of these reforms began 
with local elections held on October 6, 2006. However, there is a lack of funding to create a 
decentralised, independent local governance system. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind 
that the local political actors might not be capable of exercising the extensive rights that the 
reform grants them, or have the political will to do so. As one employee at the CEGSTAR 
explained: “Recently I was carrying out a survey with the new municipalities. When I asked the 
speakers of sakrebulos if they had any problems, many answered: ‘No we don’t have any 
problems, why should we? I was elected by everyone in the sakrebulo, not only by the National 
Movement representatives but also by the opposition.’” In many municipalities, the local 
politicians are thus not accustomed to the idea that they should initiate and implement a political 
agenda, or address and solve local problems. This passivity is probably a Soviet legacy that is 
difficult to change in the short term. This is especially the case in Javakheti, which is still ruled 
through a centrally co-opted clan system.  
 
2. The October 2006 Local Elections in Javakheti  
On October 6 2006, local self governance elections were conducted in Georgia. In Ninotsminda 
rayon the only registered party was Saakashvili’s National Movement (see above), while the 
National Movement and ‘Industry Will Save Georgia’ (hereafter referred to as the 
‘Industrialists’) were registered in Akhalkalaki. Initially, Igor Giorgadze’s ‘Justice Party’ also 
opened an office in Akhalkalaki, but never registered for the elections. The fact that there were 
so few opponents to the governing party was a nationwide problem – since the Rose Revolution 
oppositional parties have been weak and non-influential. In fact, Akhalkalaki turned out to be 
one of the rayons in Georgia that had the highest number of votes for an opposition party: The 
National Movement got 64 percent of the votes, while the Industrialists got 32 percent.
68
 The 
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 The Industrialists received 3 party list positions, while the National Movement received 7 in Akhalkalaki rayon. 
In the Majoritarian positions 15 out of 22 positions belong to National Movement supporters while the remaining 7 
have formed a so-called ‘Initiative group’ and were initially loyal to the Industrialists. In Ninotsminda rayon, the 
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popularity of the Industrialists is due to the fact that United Javakhk had made a deal with them 
to run on their list, in order to be able to participate in the elections.
69
 The existing ban on 
regional political parties might be negative for the integration of Georgian regions which are 
compactly settled by national minorities. In other post-Communist countries the establishment of 
regional parties supported by national minorities have had a positive impact on political 
participation and, in the long run, integration of densely settled national minorities.
70
 The reason 
for the success of United Javakhk (i.e. the Industrialists) in the Akhalkalaki elections is probably 
that they are seen as a young and energetic force compared to the old, co-opted and corrupt 
political leadership. United Javakhk claim that they got more than 32 percent of the votes in 
Akhalkalaki rayon. Once the elections were over, their supporters started protesting against the 
election results, stating that 70 percent of the voters voted for them, which was the percentage of 
the vote won by the Industrialists in the city of Akhalkalaki. They claim that the results in the 
other election districts were falsified since they were not able to monitor the elections there. 
However, local National Movement representatives claim that United Javakhk had more people 
monitoring the polling stations than they did.
71
 Indisputably, falsifications and fraud were carried 
out in Javakheti. According to international and local observers there were question marks in 
relation to the appointment of local Election Committee members, as well as problems with the 
voters’ lists (for example: the deceased were not deleted from the civil registry data, individuals 
were registered in the wrong villages and thereby could not vote) and with technical voting 
procedures. It is, however, not possible to verify the extent of the falsifications and fraud. 
International monitoring was sporadic; even though there were mobile monitors from the OSCE 
and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), they had no possibility 
of monitoring the elections properly. According to ISFED, substantial irregularities were 
                                                                                                                                                       
National Movement was the only registered party, which thus received the total number of the party list votes (10), 
and 9 out of 10 Majoritarian seats (the last was an independent candidate).  
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 According to United Javakhk they tried to contact other oppositional parties, for example Salome Zourabishvili’s 
party ‘Georgia’s Way’, but they did not want them on their lists. Probably they were assumed to be extremists.   
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 See Denis Dafflon, “Managing Ethnic Diversity in Javakheti: Two European Models Of Multilingual Tertiary 
Education” (ECMI Working Paper 25, February 2006), available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_25.pdf.  
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 Author’s interview. 
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observed during the pre-election and election day processes.
72
 The ratio of inaccurate results was 
most likely higher in the more remote and mountainous villages.
73
 
However, United Javakhk did not file any complaints to the District Election Committee (or 
anybody else), and neither were they able to specify exactly where and how the elections had 
been falsified to the extent that they claim. When asked about why they did not document the 
fraud or file proper complaints, they claim that the elections were announced so unexpectedly
74
, 
that they themselves were naïve and did not know the procedures.
75
 Instead, two days after the 
elections some 300 United Javakhk supporters tried to take over the temporary office of the 
District Election Committee in Akhalkalaki. Discussions got heated, and developed into a 
confrontation between local police and United Javakhk supporters, and the local, newly-
appointed chief of police was taken to hospital. Despite the initial disagreements between the 
‘old actors’ and the young ones, however, the new sakrebulo in early 2007 unanimously voted 
for a speaker, Khachik Aivazyan, and eventually re-elected Arthur Yeremyan, the gamgebeli 
who had been in his post since 2003. The young actors received no influential posts in the new 
sakrebulo (i.e. posts that come with a salary).  
 
3. Education Reforms 
Another important way for the central government to create a unified Georgia is through 
extensive reforms in the educational sector, in primary, secondary and higher educational 
facilities. In 2005 the Law on General Education was ratified, which aims at creating a 
standardized merit-based education system. Decentralised school governance has been 
introduced; according to the reform, a board of trustees composed of teachers and parents should 
be the decision-making body. The schools have also been restructured so that each school gets 
vouchers based on how many teaching hours they need. Furthermore, the reform also aims at 
raising the qualification of teachers and head teachers by conducting trainings and arranging 
qualifying tests. 
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 The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), Report on Monitoring the October 5, 2006 
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 One respondent from a remote village, for example, admitted to having earned 300 USD from a candidate by 
voting in the place of about 30 elderly people. 
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 Initially the president had proposed to conduct elections in December 2006, but then announced it for October: 
this raised concerns as to whether candidates would have enough time to hand in their registrations.  
75
 Author’s interview. 
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It is envisaged that by 2010 Georgian will be the main language of instruction in 
Georgian Language and Literature, History and Geography of Georgia and other social sciences 
in minority language schools.
 76
 At the same time, a project carried out by the Ministry of 
Education and Science in collaboration with the OSCE is translating Georgian books into 
minority languages. The UNDP has also financed new material for teaching Georgian in 
multilingual environments.
77
 Previously public schooling in minority languages was allowed all 
over Georgia; in Javakheti it was mainly conducted in Russian or Armenian.
78
 Now these 
schools have to gradually increase the number of subjects taught in Georgian, starting with 
history and geography. These, however, are sensitive subjects in Javakheti. Most local 
Armenians demand that their children should be taught Armenian history, at least as an extra-
curricular subject, but so far no books have been elaborated and approved by the Ministry of 
Education and Science. Therefore most schools teach Armenian history with books provided 
from Armenia, but without being able to give official grades to the pupils. This creates problems 
for students that wish to study Humanities in Armenia, where these grades are required. 
Moreover, schools are required to become more cost efficient. This will most probably create 
mergers of smaller schools, a process that might affect minority schools negatively.
79
 In schools 
where Georgian is not the language of instruction, three Georgian-language lessons per week are 
obligatory from first grade onwards. As of today, even qualified Georgian language teachers are 
lacking in Javakheti. One project initiated in 2004 aimed at attracting qualified Georgian 
teachers to teach the Georgian language, literature and history in minority language schools in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli by offering them a much higher salary than normal (500 
GEL instead of 100 GEL). Since the teachers were not bilingual they had problems with teaching 
methodologies, often relied on teaching the pupils phrases by heart, and the impact of the 
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 The rest of the Social Sciences should continuously be taught in Georgian, while Mathematics, Natural Sciences, 
Foreign Languages, Physical Education and Fine Arts can be taught in minority languages.  
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 See Bela Tsipuria, ‘From State Language Education to Civic Integration’, Language Policies and Education in 
Multilingual Societies (CIMERA Publications, 2006), p.19. 
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 For example in Akhalkalaki there are 3 Armenian schools, 1 Russian and 1 Georgian. In addition there has been a 
school at the Russian military base, but it will be closed down in May 2007. In Ninotsminda there are 2 Armenian, 1 
Russian and 1 Georgian school. In the villages there is normally one Armenian school, apart from the villages where 
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 For example, the Georgian schools in Javakheti might be merged with the surrounding Armenian schools, which 
will be detrimental for the learning process of the Georgian speaking children. The secondary school in Sameba, 
Ninotsminda rayon might for example soon be merged with a neighbouring Armenian school due to lack of finances 
for heating. See The Messenger, ‘Georgian secondary school to close in the village of Sameba’, 2007-02-27. 
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program was limited.
80
 Many of these ‘imported’ teachers left, as they could not put up with the 
hard living conditions in the region. The project finished in the summer of 2006, and so far few 
state efforts to improve the language and methodology skills of teachers have been carried out.
81
 
Therefore, as schools gradually introduce additional subjects in Georgian, the lack of bilingual, 
qualified teachers using interactive, task-based and child-oriented methodologies will become a 
problem, as will the need for suitable teaching materials for teaching Georgian as a second 
language. Even if the schools in Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki are able to find teachers, the 
remote villages will not. Another matter that irritates local Armenian-speaking teachers is the 
higher salary received by Georgian teachers. Today, a standard monthly salary is 100 GEL, but 
teachers in Georgian Language, History and Geography normally get 12 GEL extra. This is 
perceived as a discriminatory hierarchy; teachers in the ‘Georgian subjects’ are worth more than 
others. Another problem is access to textbooks and teaching aids. Today, Javakhetian schools are 
provided with Armenian school books for free, while the Georgian books are either very 
outdated or new and expensive. In some cases the books are not even available.
82
 
In the new Law on Higher Education (2004), the Ministry of Education and Science has 
made the accreditation procedure for higher learning institutions stricter. Previously, there 
existed 127 universities in Georgia; now there are only 34 accredited public universities left.
83
 
There also used to be an abundance of university branches. Today only two are left; one in 
Sighnaghi and the Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi State University.
84
  
The ongoing reforms in the higher education sector will probably increase the quality of 
education markedly, and make it more attractive in the long run to study in Georgian 
universities. Studying in Georgia is less expensive than in Armenia, both in terms of 
accommodation and university fees, and these two factors in combination will probably make 
university studies in Georgia gradually more attractive – if the students are able to speak good 
enough Georgian. 
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 Britta Korth, Arnold Stepanian, Marina Muskhelishvili Language Policy in Georgia - With a Focus on the 
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 The international NGO CIMERA is however financing multilingual schooling and methods in Samtskhe-
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 The books cost 5-7 GEL each, which is costly for the families. In terms of availability, one interviewed teacher 
gave an example that they only had 10 copies for the 7
th
 grade, which only covered one third of the class.   
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 See http://www.mes.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=850.  
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 However, currently, the Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi State University cannot get a renewed accreditation before 
2008 since it failed to fulfil the Ministry of Education and Science’s technical requirements; for example, the library 
is deemed insufficient. Thereby they cannot accept new students until they manage to obtain a proper accreditation.  
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For national minorities the educational reform is problematic in terms of what language 
the students can study in and also in terms of passing the standardised Unified National 
Examinations (UNEs). Firstly, it is no longer possible to study in languages other than Georgian 
at state universities – apart from at the Departments of Philology. (There are, however, private 
universities teaching in English, such as the ‘Caucasus School of Business’ or the ‘Georgian 
Institute of Public Affairs’). Secondly, standardized national exams, the so-called UNEs, have 
been introduced for those who want to enter a Georgian university.
85
 In 2005 UNEs were held 
for the first time and turned out to be disastrous for the minority students; out of 64 Armenian 
applicants from Javakheti only 4 passed. The following year, after the OSCE initiated a special 
intensive language training course, in collaboration with the Georgian language houses in 
Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, the scores got markedly better: according to the Georgian 
Language House in Ninotsminda, 48 students from Javakheti applied in 2006 and 21 passed.
86
  
The Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi State University initially worked on a quota basis (60 
percent Armenians and 40 percent Georgians). Now the quota system has been eliminated by the 
educational reform and these changes are upsetting for locals, who assume that abolishing the 
quota system is a way of marginalising their interests, since ‘their’ children are not able to enter 
‘their’ university. During 2006, the university claimed that the ratio of students remained the 
same: 60 percent of the 382 students are Armenian and 40 percent are Georgian, and therefore, 
that there is no reason to worry.
87
 Still, it can be stated that the UNEs create new obstacles for 
prospective students from compactly settled minority regions such as Javakheti to enter Georgian 
universities.
88
 
 
4. Administrative reforms 
Apart from reforming the local self governance system and the educational sector, the Georgian 
government is now trying to institutionalise administrative practises and establish rule of law 
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 The exam in 2005 was testing the level of Georgian Language and Literature, General Abilities, Foreign 
Languages and Mathematics. For 2006 the test was slightly altered so that students could also pass the added tests in 
Geography and History in Russian.  
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 Statistics provided by the Georgian Language House in Ninotsminda. 
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 In fact, a bi-lingual university could be an important integrating factor for regionally isolated national minorities. 
This was the case in Romania. See Denis Dafflon, ‘Managing Ethnic Diversity in Javakheti: Two European Models 
Of Multilingual Tertiary Education’ (ECMI Working Paper 25, February 2006), available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_25.pdf. 
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throughout the entire country. This is yet another way of integrating the formerly disconnected 
regions with the rest of Georgia.  
During the Soviet period the population in Javakheti had little or no contact with the 
Georgian language. In practice, Russian has been the administrative language in Javakheti ever 
since the 1830s, while Armenian has been functioning as the major spoken language of 
communication. Even after Georgian independence in 1991, Russian continued to function as the 
unofficial administrative language in Javakheti. During Shevardnadze’s time the region mainly 
had contacts with nearby Armenia or with the Russian Federation, and Georgian influence was 
close to non-existent. From 1991 to 1995 extensive rights with regard to using minority 
languages in official contexts were given to the citizens. However, in the 1995 constitution 
Georgian was made the sole state language, along with Abkhaz in Abkhazia. The law also made 
it the responsibility of the ‘interested party’ – not the state – to translate necessary documents 
into Georgian. But neither the local authorities nor, for that matter, the central state enforced this 
legislation. Today the situation has changed markedly. 
In order to work in the public sector, Georgian law requires a certain command of 
Georgian. The state authorities are now attempting to create a merit-based bureaucratic cadre by 
firing incompetent and/or corrupt staff and, in parallel, by raising the salaries of the remaining 
employees. They also carry out tests on basic knowledge of the state language, the Georgian 
constitution and relevant legislation. So far doctors, judges and lawyers have been tested and 
head teachers are currently being tested.  
These reforms are, however, problematic in Javakheti. The region is densely populated by 
national minorities out of which the absolute majority – including those who used to be 
employed as local civil servants – do not know Georgian. Officially, Armenian government 
employees should use Georgian in all contexts, and communicate with each other in Georgian. 
Nevertheless, even in the local sakrebulo, where the working language is officially Georgian, the 
vast majority of elected representatives speak only Armenian and Russian.  
In some cases civil servants were able to do the test with the help of an interpreter, but 
this possibility seems to be an ad hoc improvisation, not an officially regulated solution.
89
 When 
new staff are hired, Armenians thus often fail to fulfill the language requirements. This has 
created tension in Javakheti. In the eyes of local Armenians, the idea of replacing Armenians at 
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 The Ministry of the Interior, for example, allows people to take tests for becoming a patrol police officer in 
Russian, if they wish – even though this is not in accordance with Georgian legislation. 
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official posts with Georgians is a discriminatory measure in itself. Knowledge of Georgian is not 
seen as a merit; rather they are of the opinion that local people should be employed to help the 
region to survive. Most people also consider locals to be more qualified since ‘they know how to 
run things here’.90 According to respondents, it is common that dismissed Armenians claim they 
were fired on basis of their ethnicity, even though it might have been because they were 
incompetent or because they were corrupt.
91
 
If the monolingual policy is enforced, it will be very difficult to run everyday business in 
Javakheti.
92
 Another problematic issue is the possibility of appealing to higher courts. Since the 
investigative documents in Akhalkalaki are not written in proper Georgian, appealing is a 
complicated procedure, as the Georgian courts can refuse to use documents written in languages 
other than Georgian. 
In addition, locals in Javakheti are not aware of Georgian laws and new administrative 
practices. It is difficult to access legislation, since it is mainly available only in Georgian. Even 
though initiatives have been carried out by the NGO community to translate legislation into 
Russian and Armenian,
93
 access is still limited. Therefore the reactions to government reforms in 
Javakheti tend to be negative. The existing information vacuum feeds suspicions and stereotypes 
among locals which in its turn creates possibilities for the local political actors to mobilise the 
population around nationalist agendas. Time and again, local respondents refer to the ongoing 
changes as ‘forced assimilation’. Partially this perception is a consequence of the government’s 
failure to develop consistent integration policies and to properly inform the population about the 
ongoing reforms.  
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 Notably this has been done by the Georgian NGO Public Movement Multinational Georgia. ECMI has also 
published a frequency dictionary where Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Azeri administrative words and concepts 
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5. The Failure to Establish Trust in Rule of Law 
The Georgian state also seeks to unify the country through reforms of the law enforcement 
agencies. The traffic police reform has been positively received by many local inhabitants.
94
 
Everyday corruption has somewhat declined. However, in general the government has so far 
failed to communicate the advantages and importance of rule of law in Javakheti. Previously, 
disagreements or illicit activities were normally solved informally. Several respondents are 
therefore upset by the fact that minor criminal offences now result in big fines. One respondent 
took a bride-kidnapping
95
 in a nearby village as an example. According to Georgian legislation, 
bride-kidnapping is illegal, but previously the law enforcement agencies did not pay attention to 
this matter. Rather, they were solved among the families. In this concrete case the man was 
sentenced to pay quite a substantial fine, which infuriated the respondent: “The authorities now 
are focused on fines. This is money that people do not have, and that only ends up in some local 
budget. But really what they should be doing is informing people about their responsibilities and 
rights. If people do not know the legislation they cannot be blamed for breaking the law. Now 
this man has to sell his assets to pay the fine or pay bribes.” 
Another example is an incident that took place in October 2005. Without prior notice, the 
financial police came from Akhaltsikhe and closed down several small shops in Akhalkalaki. 
These shops had not reported their incomes during the previous three months, and consequently 
had not paid any taxes. This had, according to the regional tax inspectorate, created a big deficit 
in the gamgeoba budget. The procedure came as a shock to the local businessmen. According to 
some, the deficit was due to incompetent local tax authorities, rather than tax evasion. Following 
the incident, about 400 people participated in a protest in Akhalkalaki. The meeting got rowdy, 
and as some representatives of the Special Troops of the Ministry of the Interior appeared, a fight 
broke out and the situation ended with one riot policeman shooting in the air to dissolve the 
protesters. One demonstrator had to be taken to hospital. President Saakashvili initially stated 
that this was just a way of trying to create law and order in a region where previously there was 
none, but some days later the regional representative of the Special Troops publicly apologized 
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 Bride-kidnapping: when a man kidnaps a woman in order to marry her, with or without her consent. 
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for the violence used while dispersing the demonstration.
96
 Why did this intervention create such 
a heated response? That the regional tax authorities inspect local shops is a normal operation in 
states with stronger institutional capacities and a higher level of public trust; for the locals of 
Javakheti, however, it was something out of the ordinary. Like in the rest of Georgia, people in 
general do not trust state authorities; neither do they see tax payment as a collective obligation. 
Rather they are accustomed to corrupt low-level officials who try to solicit bribes from them. If 
they start to pay taxes, they reason, they would have to raise the prices so that locals could not 
afford to buy their products, and they would have no means for survival. More nationalistic 
respondents referred to this incident as the beginning of a ‘police state’ era. Thus, the population 
in Javakheti has a clear tendency to interpret the enforcement of rule of law as a discriminatory 
act committed against them. 
 
6. Language – the Biggest Barrier to Integration  
For Georgian authorities trying to establish ‘national unity’, knowledge of the state language is a 
must – in order for the regions to implement local self-governance reform, to take advantage of 
the reformed education system or enjoy more ‘transparent’ administrative practices. Today, 
language is therefore the biggest barrier to integration of national minorities in Georgia. Up until 
recently the population had difficulties in understanding why Georgian could be beneficial for 
them. Today, they are more inclined to learn Georgian, since it is difficult to get jobs both in 
Armenia and Russia and the Georgian state is pushing the language issue much more. But the 
population in Javakheti has been given few opportunities to learn the state language. There is no 
environment for learning Georgian, and there is a lack of clear incentives and methodological 
learning support. The Georgian state has not managed to create consistent programs for language 
trainings either for adults, or for pupils of secondary schools. Trainings have been carried out by 
the OSCE, but their impact has been limited
97
 and they are now withdrawing from the region. A 
typical comment is “I hope that it will be possible for our small children to speak Georgian, but 
for me it will be difficult to manage properly, and also for my children who are about to graduate 
from secondary school it is very difficult to have such a good command of Georgian that they 
need in order to enter university or get a job.”  
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This way of promoting the state language de jure follows international recommendations on 
national minorities.98 In addition, it can be said to be a precondition for a truly integrated 
Georgian state in the long run. But in the short term it creates a discriminatory attitude towards 
the compactly settled national minorities in Javakheti, since they receive no real opportunities 
and proper resources to learn Georgian, and are thereby excluded from full participation in 
public life.99 In addition, monolingualism is not compatible with the European Charter for 
Regional Languages that Georgia has pledged to ratify. Local actors therefore demand either that 
Armenian should be allowed at least for a transitory period of 15-20 years, or that it should be 
granted the permanent status of administrative language in the region. This demand is in 
accordance with international minority rights recommendations, albeit as a recommendation 
rather than an obligation.
100
 In the words of one of the more ‘radical’ local actors: “You know, 
we didn’t arrive here recently; we were here before independence was declared in 1918, and this 
is our homeland, and our state. When the referendum was held in 1991 people here voted for the 
old constitution from 1921 that stated that we had the right to use our language in the region. 
And what do we get now? It would have been better if we had fought, like South Ossetia, they 
are now being offered extensive autonomic solutions while we get nothing.”
101
  
In the following section, some differences between Armenians and Georgians in terms of 
perception will be discussed. The focus will lie on the perception of history, the fear of 
demographic change, the tendency for mass meetings, the negative role of media and the idea of 
the future status of Javakheti.  
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VI. DISPUTED ISSUES: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY AND AUTONOMY 
 
1. The Historical Settlers of Javakheti  
Armenians have been living in today’s Georgia since the early Middle Ages. Historically they 
were urban dwellers, mainly engaged in trade and handicrafts.
102
 When they inhabited the 
Javakheti region, however, is a matter of disagreement between Armenians and Georgians. The 
Armenians on one hand claim that there have always been Armenians in Javakheti. Georgian 
historians, on the other hand, argue that Armenians arrived only after 1829. This difference of 
opinion surfaces in disagreements about the historical origin of churches in Javakheti.
103
  What 
can be taken for fact is that the absolute majority of Armenians in Javakheti resettled there in the 
19
th 
century. One wave of around 30,000 Armenians arrived when the Russian-Ottoman war 
ended in 1829, after the territory had been annexed by Russia. The second major wave of 
Armenians arrived from Eastern Anatolia
104
 after the forced expulsion of Armenians from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1915. They were mostly fleeing from Turkish massacres of Christians. This 
historical experience is an essential part of the collective identity of Armenians in Javakheti, and 
creates impediments for such matters as the planned repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to 
Javakheti.
 105
 
 
2. The Miscommunication on Churches 
The origin of the historical inhabitants in Javakheti is thus disputed between Armenians and 
Georgians. Another interconnected and equally sensitive topic is the historical origin of specific 
churches. So far the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Georgian Orthodox Church have failed 
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 The majority of today’s population belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, while a minority are Roman 
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to reach a common understanding or agreement as to how to deal with some specific churches.
106
 
Since local church representatives do not communicate with each other, several 
misunderstandings have developed into violent encounters between local Armenians and 
Georgian Orthodox groups. This occurred in the villages of Koumordo and Samsari. In the case 
of the 11
th
 century church in Koumordo the dispute started some years ago but became more 
heated during Easter 2004 and 2005, when Georgian Orthodox believers tried to make 
pilgrimages to the church. According to locals they came unannounced to the village and the 
locals did not want to let them enter the church; they also threw eggs at them.
107
 In the case of 
Samsari, the dispute is over the remains of an ancient cave church complex, 
108
 and reached its 
peak in the summer of 2005 when a Georgian student expedition tried to go there to, in their 
understanding, restore the church. This, however, also implied taking away newer Armenian 
Apostolic inscriptions. Fist fights broke out, and two Georgian students ended up in hospital with 
concussion. In villages inhabited by Armenians, old Georgian (or possibly Greek) churches have 
also been adapted to the Armenian Apostolic liturgy.
109
  
Another incident that yet again points to miscommunication between the two churches 
and their congregations took place in early January 2006 when Father Nikoloz, the Georgian 
Archbishop in Akhalkalaki, was celebrating the New Year by shooting fireworks without prior 
notice. Instead of enjoying the fireworks, a part of the local population in Akhalkalaki thought a 
war had started, and consequently the following day United Javakhk’s boy scouts arranged a 
demonstration claiming that Javakheti is their land and that the ‘aggressive’ Georgian Orthodox 
church should leave. (During the April 2005 demonstrations, they also entered the monastery to 
‘check if they had weapons’; the tumult was dissolved by the police.)  
The Armenians see the churches as ‘theirs’, and perceive the Georgian Orthodox 
believers as aggressive intruders, while the Georgian side want to restore what they see as their 
indisputable cultural heritage. As of today the situation is frozen, and neither the Armenian 
Apostolic Church nor the Georgian Orthodox Church is officially using these churches. In 2005 
a joint Georgian-Armenian commission was set up to study the historical backgrounds of the 
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churches.
110
 However, so far there have been no results. Since Georgia does not have a law on 
religion, it is impossible for the Church to acquire the status of a legal entity. Instead, it is 
proposed by the Georgian authorities that the Church should register as an NGO and thereby be 
able to function in Georgian society. This is something that the Armenian Apostolic Church 
opposes. In the words of Father Babken, the Deputy Archbishop stationed in Javakheti: ‘These 
Armenians are citizens of Georgia, but their church is not being acknowledged by the state. Why 
is this so?’ As a consequence of this, individual Armenian churches cannot be registered and 
have no legal status in Javakheti. 
 
3. The Fear of Demographic Change 
As mentioned, there exists a fear of demographic change among Javakhetians. This fear 
originates both from when the Armenians left today’s Turkey, and also from the early 1990s. As 
many Dukhobors in Ninotsminda rayon migrated to Russia in the early independence years, their 
houses were bought by the then state-affiliated ‘Merab Kostava Foundation’ in order to resettle 
ecological migrants from Adjara there.
111
 This was during the Gamsakhurdia period, and the 
Foundation was partially based on a nationalist ideology, according to which altering the 
demographic balance in Javakheti in favour of ethnic Georgians was seen as an advantage for 
securing the historical Georgian nation. Informally established organisations with funding from 
Armenia (such as the Parvana) therefore also bought houses to safeguard their ethnic kin. After 
more than a decade, most of the Adjarans have left, and local Armenians for the most part live 
illegally in the houses provided for Georgian eco-migrants. Only one village is densely inhabited 
by Adjarans, and some of these individuals indeed portray themselves as guardians of Georgia 
proper. Accordingly, local Armenians have a constant fear that the government will compactly 
settle more Georgians in the region, or repatriated Meskhetian Turks.
112
 This fear also creates 
tension with other groups residing in Javakheti, notably the Russian Dukhobors.
113
 Every step 
and reform made by the Georgian authorities is thus seen as a way to push the Armenians from 
their native lands. 
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However, this slightly paranoid attitude is not unique for the Javakheti Armenians. 
Interviews with the Georgian authorities and individuals show that they have extreme 
perceptions of what Javakheti is – even though the absolute majority of them have never visited 
the region. There are still lingering suspicions that the Armenians are ‘treacherous separatists’, 
who would start a war as soon as they are granted the opportunity to do so – just like Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians. In fact, it is often mentioned that the Armenians participated on the side of 
the Abkhaz in the civil wars of the nineties. Some Georgian respondents went as far as to suspect 
that the population is a fifth column of the Russian KGB, who are present in Javakheti in order to 
infiltrate Georgia. In fact, it is often stated from the Georgian side that Russian security forces 
are deeply involved in Javakheti politics. This presence, however, is difficult to trace. This 
conviction might be reinforced by the fact that Javakheti used to be an isolated, high security 
military border zone with special restrictions, and that these suspicions remain in the mentality of 
locals and in the minds of Georgian officials. 
In some Georgian eyes, the mass demonstrations in Javakheti are not signs of socio-
economic problems or discrimination; rather they are an act of betrayal by recent guests on 
Georgian territory. The fact that they do not speak Georgian is also seen as a sign of disrespect 
and lack of goodwill, and it is assumed that if they do not speak Georgian they cannot be 
expected to get any help from the Georgian state.
114
 According to Georgian respondents, it is 
normal that these Armenians should turn to ‘their’ ethnic kin, and to ‘their’ state Armenia rather 
than to the Georgian authorities if they encounter problems.
115
 
Local Armenians thus tend to victimize themselves and are in constant fear of 
assimilation attempts by the central government, of ‘white genocide’ as they describe it (i.e. 
when they are forced away due to unbearable living conditions) or forced demographic change. 
This tendency is exploited by the local political organisations to boost their popularity and to 
mobilise the rural population around their demands. The victimization is in its turn seen as a 
danger of separatism from the Georgians, which perpetuates the vicious circle. 
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4. The Constant Perception of Discrimination 
As mentioned above, Armenians in Javakheti see themselves under constant threat. The failure 
of the Georgian state to deliver socio-economic, infrastructural and technical improvements to 
the region is often seen as discrimination, rather than a consequence of a weak state with 
insufficient funding and capacities to deliver public goods. For example, when there is a shortage 
of electricity this is seen not as a general failure of the Georgian state to deliver public services 
to all regions in Georgia, but as discrimination against them as Armenians. Another example of 
this is how one respondent referred to the fact that there is central heating in the Georgian school 
in Akhalkalaki (about 60 pupils in total), whereas the three Armenian schools in town do not 
have central heating (where there are several hundred students in each school). In their 
understanding, Georgians are first class citizens who receive high quality public goods, while the 
Armenians will have to settle for worse living conditions.  
 
5. Mass Meetings Instead of Political Participation 
Mostly local political organisations have expressed political ideas through demonstrations, rather 
than representative politics. Partly this might be related to the constitutional ban on regional 
parties. How this can be detrimental to a solution of the problems that Javakheti faces is 
illustrated by the way United Javakhk organised demonstrations from March 2005 to April 2006. 
On March 13, 2005 United Javakhk arranged a mass demonstration against the closure of the 
military base. Estimates of the number of participants vary, ranging from 10,000 to 3,000. 
During these mass demonstrations United Javakhk also demanded that the Georgian government 
should acknowledge the Armenian genocide of 1915, make it possible to officially teach Armenian 
history in Armenian-language schools, adopt a law on protecting minority rights, and develop self-
governance and regional infrastructure.116 Initially this demonstration drew the attention of 
government representatives. The organisers of the demonstrations were invited to meet the 
Minister of the Interior, Vano Merabishvili. Promises were made to compensate the loss of 
employment opportunities that the withdrawal of the base would create. The local activists 
perceived that the state took their opinions into account.
117
 Not long after the demonstrations a 
regional branch for issuing passports was opened, and a mobile driver’s license service was 
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initiated. (These two provisions had also been demanded at the demonstrations.) Following this 
initial success, mass meetings turned into a standard formula for United Javakhk.  
In January 2006, United Javakhk used similar mass protests to secure a resumption of the 
electricity supply in much of Akhalkalaki. Following the protests, individual electric meters were 
eventually installed in Akhalkalaki rayon in accordance with the demonstrators’ demands. Given 
their success, these acts of civil disobedience seemed a rather promising approach to politics: 
quick action, and quick results. What creates the mobilisation possibilities for these 
demonstrations are socio-economic problems (as with the closure of the military base) or general 
mismanagement (like the electricity incident), which is addressed by local organisations. If the 
state does not act, it is then perceived as a matter of ethnic discrimination – a convincing basis 
for mobilisation for local Javakhetians.  
However, civil disobedience did not prove a sustainable strategy for United Javakhk. 
Following another incident in April 2006 when demonstrations organised by United Javakhk 
over the death of an Armenian man in the town of Tsalka turned into a mini-riot in which a court 
and the university were forcibly broken into, much of the goodwill that initially surrounded the 
movement evaporated. Recently the Georgian authorities have begun tracking down the 
organisers of the demonstrations. In November 2006 a court case was initiated against Arthur 
Pogosyan, the ‘main activist’ in the January 2006 demonstrations against the electricity 
distributing company. Pogosyan was consequently sentenced to pay 2,000 GEL in fines and was 
given two years probation. The judge claims that cases are being prepared against the people 
who were active during the April 2006 demonstrations as well.   
 
6. The Negative Role of the Media 
The mutual suspicions discussed above have their origin in the xenophobia of the Gamsakhurdia 
period and the ethno-territorial conflicts during the early nineties. These legacies have left 
Georgians afraid of losing control over yet another region of the country. However, the lingering 
mistrust is reinforced by a mutual lack of accurate information.
 
Javakheti’s inhabitants rely 
mainly on Armenian and Russian information,
118
 as they do not understand the Georgian 
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broadcasts, and Russian news outlets often portray Georgia in a negative light and do not 
accurately cover Georgia’s internal politics.
119
 
On the Georgian side the information on Javakheti is also often negative.
120
 The only 
news that ever reaches Tbilisi is when another mass meeting has been arranged, and often the 
shows are edited in such a way that the entire population is portrayed as dangerous separatists, 
rather than discontented Georgian citizens from the region demanding socio-economic 
improvements. This creates the impression that Javakheti is a potential ‘hot spot’ and not just the 
home of a few nationalists that are mobilising a marginalised minority population which lives 
under a severe socio-economic situation, is heavily dependent on Russian money and was 
previously completely detached from Georgia. 
 
7. The Non-Resolved Status of Javakheti 
One of the biggest question marks in terms of regional integration and local self governance is 
the frozen situation in relation to Georgia’s two breakaway republics. As long as the future status 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains uncertain, there is no obvious answer as to how the 
territory of Georgia will ultimately be arranged and what types of responsibilities and freedoms 
will be given to the respective regions of the country.121 This complicates the integration of 
Javakheti, where respondents feel the need for settling their status and the level of their 
autonomy. In this context it is important to remember that what respondents mean by the word 
‘autonomy’ varies. Some attribute only limited definitions of cultural autonomy to the concept, 
while others talk about a high level of economic and political self governance. Contrary to what is 
often stated in Georgia, the political actors in Javakheti have never raised secessionist claims, 
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only claims for autonomy or federative solutions.122 In the words of United Javakhk leader 
Vahag Chakhalyan: “We want stability, and not war. My wife is Georgian, so why would I want 
a conflict? We had the opportunity for secession in the 90s, and didn’t take it then.”123  
Rather, it is the language issue that is the biggest barrier to the integration of Javakheti. It 
is thus mainly a matter of cultural and linguistic autonomy that the local population as well as 
the radicals want to safeguard – something which Javakheti used to have during Soviet times. 
This cultural and linguistic autonomy is put in jeopardy by the monolingual drive by the 
authorities, according to many respondents. This wish to reinforce the Georgian language 
throughout the country is an important measure to create a cohesive democratic state, but 
currently it is done without proper support to its remote and linguistically isolated minority 
regions, notably Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli mkhare. This Georgian hardline 
monolingual attitude might even be detrimental to the creation of ‘national unity’ since it 
decreases trust among Javakhetians. 
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VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Today, Javakheti has become psychologically and socially closer to the rest of Georgia 
compared to a couple of years ago. This can be seen, for example, in the way the Georgian Lari 
is becoming more commonly used in market places relative to the Russian Rouble. The 
infrastructural improvements also make it easier and quicker to travel from Javakheti to Tbilisi. 
The majority of Javakhetians have accustomed themselves to the fact that the Russian military 
base will withdraw from Javakheti. The withdrawal, in combination with the current stalemate in 
Georgian-Russian relations, will, however, create additional economic difficulties and, very 
possibly, an increased unemployment rate for an already impoverished region. As of today the 
government has not offered any viable alternatives in terms of employment generation, or any 
strategies for developing agriculture – which is one of the very few remaining means of survival 
for locals. The situation is slightly improved by international NGOs such as CHF, which offers 
microfinance alternatives for farmers. 
Generally speaking, the local population in Javakheti consider themselves to be citizens 
of Georgia. However, they do not feel welcomed by the central government and are convinced 
that they, as national minorities, are being treated as second-class citizens. Local respondents 
also fear that the central authorities want to change the demographic balance and force them 
away from their ancestral lands by creating bad living conditions (what radicals refer to as a 
‘white genocide’). Therefore, Javakhetians remain easily mobilized by nationalist slogans, and 
perceive the poor socio-economic situation, which can be found in all remote regions of Georgia, 
as ethnic discrimination.  
Local actors remain easily co-opted by the central authorities, and this is probably one of 
the main impediments for bringing about a true integration of Javakheti. As long as they are 
more interested in private deals and profits, instead of creating change for the region, no real 
regional development will take place in Javakheti.  
It should also be noted that the nationalist actors (for example United Javakhk) remain 
unable to address problems on a local level, or to hold their local politicians accountable for the 
lack of changes. Instead, they focus on cultural and linguistic issues, using demonstrations as the 
main tool for change – a detrimental choice since it intimidates and infuriates Georgian public 
opinion.  
45 
The Georgian government attempts to create ‘national unity’ by applying a strictly 
monolingual policy, i.e. that Georgian should be used as a language of instruction also in the 
minority language schools (albeit introduced gradually) and at university; and it should be the 
only administrative language used throughout Georgia. However, proper tools for improving 
language skills in the linguistically isolated Javakheti are still lacking. Attempts to create 
national unity are made in an inconsistent way, without understanding the need for balancing 
integration with protection of minority rights. Thus, the government is trying to use sticks 
instead of carrots towards its national minorities, forcing them to learn the state language as soon 
as possible. This attitude tends to deter local Armenians, who have not been given the 
opportunities to learn the state language.  
Even though the Georgian government has started to address the ‘hard’ issues – renovating 
schools and roads and attempting to establish a merit-based bureaucratic cadre – it is still lagging 
far behind in terms of ‘soft’ issues – creating trust, establishing accountable local governance 
and safeguarding minority rights (especially linguistic ones), as well as improving the political 
participation of minorities at central level. Therefore the recent reforms which strive towards an 
integrated Georgia run the risk of being counterproductive in Javakheti if nothing is done to ease 
the socio-economic consequences of the Russian military base withdrawal and to increase the 
trust of the population.   
